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UNPLEASANT DUTIES: IMPOSING SANCTIONS FOR
FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
Mark R. Kravitz*
Faced with ever growing caseloads, federal and state
appellate judges often decry the number of truly frivolous
appeals that lawyers file each year. Frivolous appeals clog
dockets, divert increasingly scarce judicial resources from
meritorious appeals and inflict unnecessary expense and burden
on those who must defend against them. Though federal and
state courts possess ample authority to impose sanctions for
frivolous appeals-in order to punish those who file them, deter
others from doing likewise, and compensate the victims of such
tactics-appellate judges have long shown a surprising
reluctance to use the tools at their disposal. As Judge Roger J.
Miner of the Second Circuit has observed of his colleagues:
"[I]t is a rare case in which we sanction even those who take
frivolous appeals."' Moreover, when appellate courts do impose
sanctions, their awards often fail adequately to compensate the
party that has had to defend against the frivolous appeal. In
particular, awarding "double costs" alone-a relatively
common sanction-has absolutely no deterrent, punitive or
* The author, who chairs the Appellate Practice Group at Wiggin & Dana in New Haven,
Connecticut, would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by Robert Koosa and Lisa
W. Levy, associates at the firm. A shorter version of this essay, entitled "Frivolous
Appeals," originally appeared in the February 11, 2002, issue of The National Law
Journal, for which the author writes a regular column devoted to appellate issues.
1. Roger J. Miner, Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A View From the
Bench, 19 Pace L. Rev. 323, 341 (1999). Judicial reluctance to grant sanctions for frivolous
appeals is not new. In a 1984 article, Professor Robert J. Martineau made a similar
observation about federal appellate courts, attributing this reluctance, at least in part, to
confusion regarding the standards for imposing sanctions. See Robert J. Martineau,
Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 Duke L.J. 845. See also Robert
J. Martineau & Patricia A. Davidson, Frivolous Appeals in the Federal Courts: The Ways
of the Circuits, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 603 (1985) (examining the approach of each federal
circuit in assessing sanctions for frivolous appeals).
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compensatory value. Such minimal awards only contribute to a
nagging sense that seeking sanctions for a frivolous appeal may
be more trouble (and expense) than it is worth.'
Doubtless, some of this judicial reluctance to impose
meaningful sanctions for frivolous appeals rightly derives from a
desire not to deter legitimate appeals or penalize those who seek
to convince courts to adopt new principles or novel positions.
Justice John Paul Stevens has thus cautioned, "Creating a risk
that the invocation of the judicial process may give rise to
punitive sanctions simply because the litigant's claim is
unmeritorious could only deter the legitimate exercise of the
right to seek a peaceful redress of grievances through judicial
means." 3 Appellate courts are properly leery of allowing parties
to abuse the rules governing appellate sanctions in the same
manner in which Rule 11 was once misused.4 Difficulties in
defining frivolity with precision may also contribute to an
unwillingness to penalize parties or lawyers for pursuing an
appeal of right.'
2. But see Scott A. Martin, Keeping Courts Afloat in a Rising Sea of Litigation: An
Objective Approach to Imposing Rule 38 Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 1156, 1156 (2002) (suggesting that "[m]ore than ever, judges are willing to impose
sanctions for abuses of federal court processes, including frivolous appeals"). Some state
appellate courts have adopted summary procedures that, among other things, may allow
those courts to eliminate frivolous appeals more promptly from their dockets and reduce
the concomitant burden that those appeals impose on the judicial system and parties. See
generally Expedited Appeals in Selected State Appellate Courts, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process
191 (2002).
3. Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted). While acknowledging that courts should not "tolerate gross abuses of
the judicial process," Justice Stevens suggested that there should be a "strong
presumption ... against the imposition of sanctions for invoking the processes of the law."
Id. at 1071-72. See also Orr v. Turco Mfg. Co., 512 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Ind. 1987) (imposing
appellate sanctions "will discourage innovation and inhibit the opportunity for periodic
reevaluation of controlling precedent").
4. For a discussion of some of the experiences under Rule II that ultimately led to the
1993 changes to that rule, see Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas Willging & Donna Stienstra,
Rule 11: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference
of the United States (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1991); Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law
of Litigation Abuse, Ch. 1, § 2 (3d ed. LEXIS Law Pub. 2000); and Joseph Solovy, The
Federal Law of Sanctions (Butterworth Legal Pub. 1991).
5. See Gilbert v. City of Salinas, 2002 WL 118609, at *8 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Jan. 29,
2002) (" [T]he borderline between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is
vague indeed.... The difficulty of drawing the line simply points up an essential corollary
to the power to dismiss frivolous appeals: that in all but the clearest cases it should not be
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However, the case law-much of which involves truly
egregious conduct in briefing or argument, or claims that are
completely without merit under any standard-suggests that
other factors are also at work. Certainly, the judiciary's well
known distaste-dare I say disdain?-for the task of
adjudicating requests for sanctions plays some role. One need
not be a cynic to come away from the case law with at least a
slight suspicion that some appellate judges view the imposition
of sanctions as an unpleasant (perhaps even demeaning) task
that they would prefer to avoid. As one judge has candidly
written, "Of all the duties of the judge, imposing sanctions on
lawyers is perhaps the most unpleasant. A desire to avoid doing
so is understandable." 6
A related factor appears to be a seeming unwillingness
among appellate judges to appreciate (or at least acknowledge in
a tangible way) the real costs that frivolous appeals inflict on
parties forced to respond to them. Courts are not the only
victims of frivolous appeals and the mere fact that an appeal
lacks all merit does not mean that it was, or even should have
been, easy and inexpensive to defend. Yet, often judges seem to
forget this simple truth. Even if appellate courts are reluctant to
protect their own institutional interests and values by punishing
and deterring those who file frivolous appeals, they should at
least provide a greater measure of justice for the parties who
were compelled to bear the costs of defending against those
appeals
used.") (citation and internal quotation omitted). See generally Martineau, supra n. 1;
Martin, supra n. 2.
6. William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule Il-A Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 205 (1985). See also Anderson v. Lindgren, 360 N.W.2d 348, 353
(Minn. App. 1984 ) (describing the decision to impose sanctions as "distasteful").
7. The focus of this essay is primarily on civil appeals, and primarily those involving
private parties represented by counsel. Criminal, habeas and prisoner appeals, as well as
appeals involving the government, all present different and more complex considerations.
So, too, do pro se appeals, where a litigant's unfamiliarity with the rules or inability to pay
a sanctions award may properly influence a court's sanctions decision. See Joseph, supra n.
4, at § 32(C); Martin, supra n. 2, at 1182. That said, many sanctions cases also involve pro
se litigants who are quite familiar with the rules and have been properly warned by courts
about their conduct but who nonetheless seek to use their pro se status as a shield to protect
against sanctions. See Farguson v. MBank Houston, 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)
("one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets"). See generally Joseph,
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I do not speak of close questions, arguable claims or
borderline cases but, rather, of patently frivolous appeals. Much
has been written by commentators and courts about the
standards for determining whether an appeal is frivolous, a topic
that is beyond the scope of this essay.' Suffice it to say that
although "frivolity, like obscenity, is difficult to define," 9 most
of us know it when we see it. For purposes of this essay, an
appeal can be frivolous in two respects-either as filed or as
argued. By the former, I mean that an appeal can be frivolous
because the judgment below is so clearly correct and the legal
authority so overwhelmingly contrary to the appellant's position
that there really is no legitimate basis on which to file the appeal
in the first place. By the latter, "as argued" category, I mean
that regardless whether arguable grounds for reversal exist at the
time the appeal is filed, the conduct of the appeal itself may also
support an award of sanctions when, for example, the
appellant-or more likely, appellant's counsel-fails to make
any coherent argument, misrepresents facts or case law or fails
to bring contrary authority to the court's attention. In either case,
the standard for frivolity is properly quite high,1° and merely
losing on appeal, even badly, is not a sufficient basis for labeling
an appeal frivolous.
State and federal appellate courts possess ample authority
to impose sanctions on parties and lawyers who file frivolous
appeals or pursue frivolous arguments and accordingly, to
compensate the victims of those tactics. The sources of that
authority are varied-from statutes and appellate rules to the
supra n. 4, at 488 (collecting cases in which circuits have awarded sanctions against pro se
litigants).
8. See generally Martineau, supra n. 1, at 850-855; Martin, supra n. 2, at 1165-1173.
This brief essay is not intended as a treatise on the law of sanctions for frivolous appeals.
Comprehensive and scholarly commentary on that subject already exists, and any lawyer
wishing to obtain sanctions for a frivolous appeal would be well advised to consult those
sources. See e.g. Joseph, supra n. 4; Solovy, supra n. 4; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3984 (2d ed., West Publg. 1996); Moore's Federal Practice § 338 (3d
ed., Matthew Bender 1997); Annotation, The Award of Damages for Dilatory Tactics in
Prosecuting Appeal in State Court, 91 A.L.R.3d 661 (Lawyers Co-op. Pub. Co. 1979 &
Supp. 2001).
9. See WSM, Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1988).
10. See Vess Beverages, Inc. v. Paddington Corp., 941 F.2d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 1991)
(noting that "[i]f sanctions were imposed every time briefs strayed from the question
before the court, few litigants would escape").
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inherent power of all appellate courts to control the judicial
process and the parties who appear before them. In federal
courts, the principal vehicles for imposing appellate sanctions
are Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28
U.S.C. § 1912." Rule 38 has existed for 65 years; section 1912
traces its roots to the Judiciary Act of 1789.12
By their terms, both the rule and the statute are permissive,
not mandatory. Rule 38 provides that "[i]f a court of appeals
determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may... award just
damages and single or double costs to the appellee." Section
1912 allows a court of appeals "in its discretion" to "adjudge to
the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or
double costs." Although the statute and rule differ slightly-the
latter speaks of "delay" while the former refers to "frivolous"
appeals-courts have long ignored this distinction and construed
both as authorizing sanctions for frivolous appeals. 3 No
showing of delay is needed. As a result, most federal courts
routinely cite both section 1912 and Rule 38 and treat them
identically. They seem also to agree that the "just damages" that
federal appellate courts may award under either the rule or the
statute may include reasonable attorneys' fees as well as
"double costs." 14
11. On occasion, federal appellate courts also invoke their inherent powers. See
Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980). Section 1927
authorizes federal district or circuit courts to require "[a]ny attorney ... who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously ... to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."
See generally Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-61 (1980) (reviewing the
legislative history of section 1927). See also 26 U.S.C. § 7482(c)(4) (1997) (authorizing
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to impose sanctions for any frivolous appeal from
a Tax Court decision); Sup. Ct. R. 42 (2) (authorizing the award of damages for frivolous
appeals or certiorari petitions).
12. See Section 23 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85; Martineau, supra n. 1, at
857 n. 68.
13. See e.g. Whitehead v. Paramount Picture Corp., Nos. 99-7137 & 99-7197, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 11716, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 2000); In re B.C. Enters., Ltd., No. 94-
16027, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8959, at *18 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 1996); Doyle v. Okla. Bar
Assn., 998 F.2d 1559, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993); Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 986 F.2d 1391, 1394
(11 th Cir. 1993); Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir. 1985).
14. Costs are itemized in Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and in 28
U.S.C. § 1920 (1978). Section 1920 lists the following as recoverable costs: (1) fees of the
clerk and marshal; (2) fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for the case; (3) printing and witness fees and
disbursements; (4) fees for exemplification and copies of necessary papers; (5) docket fees;
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For a time there was some question whether Rule 38 and
section 1912 applied to lawyers, but courts now construe these
provisions as authorizing sanctions against either appellants
(including pro se appellants) or their counsel, or both. 5
Appellees, however, cannot be punished under Rule 38 or
section 1912, no matter how frivolous their position on appeal, a
regrettable anomaly in the federal rules. 6
A large and increasing number of state appellate courts also
now recognize their authority to levy sanctions, including
attorneys' fees, for a frivolous appeal, gleaning their authority
from statutes, court rules and their own inherent power. 7 Thus,
in a decision fairly typical of state court rulings on appellate
sanctions, the Idaho Supreme Court recently noted that
and (6) compensation for interpreters, salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of interpretation
services, and compensation of court-appointed experts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Federal
courts often award a lump sum, without distinguishing between attorneys' fees and costs.
See e.g. Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 1997).
15. See e.g. Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp., 58 F.3d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(imposing sanctions on attorney); Osuch v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 970 F.2d
394, 396 (7th Cir. 1992) (indicating that sanctions could be imposed on attorney); Quiroga
v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991) (imposing sanctions on attorney); In re
Lowell H. Becraft, Jr., 885 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that sanctions might be
imposed against pro se litigants, litigants represented by counsel, and appellate counsel);
Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 818 (5th Cir. 1988) (indicating that sanctions can be
imposed upon either attorney or attorney and client together, and imposing responsibility
for attorneys' fees on attorney and responsibility for costs on client); Braley v. Campbell,
832 F.2d 1504, 1511 (1Oth Cir. 1987) (en banc) (imposing sanctions against attorney).
16. See e.g. Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
17. See generally Alan Stephens, Attorney's Liability Under State Low for Opposing
Party's Counsel Fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486, 491-95 (1987). Some state courts have adopted
the federal rules, including Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See e.g.
Ala. R. App. P. 38; Colo. App. R. 38(d); Haw. R. App. P. 38 (reflecting some minor
differences in wording from federal Rule 38). Many other states have adopted their own
rules, which accomplish much the same purpose as Rule 38. For example, Indiana
Appellate Rule 66(E) provides: "The court may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or
motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court's discretion
and may include attorneys' fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution." Indiana's
provision is similar to rules adopted in many other states, as demonstrated by the following
illustrative, but not comprehensive, list. See e.g. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 907; 2001 Kan. S. Ct.
R. 7.07(c); Mo. R. App. P. 84.19; Pa. R. App. P. 2744; Tex. R. App. P. 45; Wash. R. App.
P. 18.9. In addition to awarding attorneys' fees, California appellate courts have required
parties who have pursued frivolous appeals to pay to the court clerk an amount equal to the
cost to the court system of processing the average civil appeal, an amount that California
appellate judges have "conservatively estimated" to be $6,000. See e.g. Keitel v. Heubel,
120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 227 (2002) (awarding $7,400), review granted, depublished, and
transferred, 54 P.3d 258 (Cal. 2002); Pierotti v. Torian, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 564 (1st
App. Dist. 3d Div. 2000).
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"[r]easonable attorneys fees... ordinarily will be awarded to
the prevailing party on appeal when this Court is left with the
abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 8 Many state
appellate courts also have held that they possess discretion to
impose sanctions not only on parties but also on lawyers who
bring or pursue frivolous appeals or positions.' 9 However, unlike
federal courts, some state appellate courts are restricted by
statutory or rule-based limits on the amount of sanctions,
particularly attorneys' fees, they may award.2°
Both state and federal courts have repeatedly proclaimed
that an award of sanctions is supposed to serve three purposes.
At the most basic level, an award of sanctions imposes
punishment for appellate misconduct or for causing appellate
judges and parties to waste their valuable time on claims that
should never have been pursued. When he was a federal circuit
judge, Justice Stephen G. Breyer explained in an oft-cited
decision the institutional reasons for levying penalties against
frivolous appeals:
[W]e believe that penalizing frivolous appeals, or those
interposed for purposes of delay, may help, at least
marginally, with the burden that an increasing case load has
placed on the courts of appeals. The nature of this
"burden" is sometimes misunderstood as if it referred to
the workload of an individual judge. In fact, it refers to the
general systemic problem of less judicial time to spend on
each individual case .... [A]s a general matter, the more
time we spend on frivolous cases, the less time we have for
18. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce County, 35 P.3d 265, 268 (Idaho 2001).
19. See e.g. Eberly v. Eberly, 489 A.2d 433, 449 (Del. 1985); Kukui Nuts of Haw., Inc.
v. R. Baird & Co, Inc., 789 P.2d 501, 517 (Haw. App. 1990), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Molokai Advertiser-News v. Anderson, 2000 Haw. App. LEXIS
208, at *9 (Haw. App. Nov. 29, 2000); First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Drovers Natl. Bank, 606
N.E.2d 1253, 1256-57 (11. App. 2d Dist. 1992); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 703 N.E.2d
1199, 1203 n.6 (Mass. App. 1999); State v. Baca, 896 P.2d 1148, 1151 (N.M. 1995); In re
Estate of Reimer, 427 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Neb. 1988); Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d
243, 248-49 (Utah 1993); Pritt v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 513 S.E.2d 161, 165-66 (W. Va.
1998).
20. See e.g. Wyo. R. App. P. 10.05 (limiting attorneys' fees for frivolous appeal to no
more than $5,000). See also White v. Hardegree, 378 S.E.2d 877, 880 (Ga. App. 1989)
(assessing maximum statutory penalty of $500 for frivolous appeal); Fraser Employees
Fed. Credit Union v. Labbe, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Me. 1998) (awarding treble costs, the
maximum allowed by the appellate rules, and $500 "to be applied to ... attorney fees").
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
problems of more serious litigants. Thus, the "frivolous"
appeal hurts other litigants and interferes with the courts'
overall mission of securing justice.2
Sanctions should also deter. Sanctions "encourage self-
policing by attorneys and strengthen the hand of those attorneys
who would discourage clients from taking legal positions totally
lacking in merit."22 As one court warned long ago, "[c]ounsel
must realize that the decision to appeal should be a considered
one, taking into account what the district court has said, and not
a knee-jerk reaction to every unfavorable ruling." 23
Finally, in addition to these institutional purposes,
sanctions should also compensate the prevailing party for the
expense of having to defend against the frivolous appeal.
Frivolous appeals are easy to file but often difficult and
expensive to defend. There is, therefore, a good reason why
court rules and statutory provisions authorizing appellate
sanctions speak of "damages": That is precisely what frivolous
appeals inflict on innocent parties. Indeed, the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 38 expressly state that sanctions
imposed under that rule are intended to provide "justice to the
appellee."
Justice Breyer thus observed in Natasha that "despite the
merits of the American system, under which each party must
pay its own attorney, that system arguably creates incentives
for... undesirable types of behavior."2 4 As is relevant to
appeals, that system may encourage a plaintiff to file an appeal
that has no merit but which a plaintiff hopes the defendant will
settle by paying the plaintiff less than what it would cost to
defend the appeal. Likewise, a defendant, who rightly owes
money to the plaintiff, may be motivated to file a frivolous
appeal in the belief that the costs and delay of having to defend
against that appeal will encourage the plaintiff to take less than
21. Natasha, Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, 763 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1985).
22. Id.; accord Nagle v. Shertzer, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993); Abastillas v. Kekona,
958 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Haw. 1998) ("[Alwards of attorneys' fees induce people to
reconsider and ensure that refusals to surrender do not burden the innocent.") (quoting
Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987)).
23. Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1975); accord
Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Dewitt v. W. P. R.R.
Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1983)).
24. Natasha, Inc., 763 F.2d at 471.
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the full amount owed.25 The imposition of sanctions for frivolous
appeals therefore compensates parties who have been victimized
by such "undesirable behavior."
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has written
of the compensatory aspect of appellate sanctions as follows:
An award of attorneys' fees under Fed. R. App. P. 38
should be fully compensatory. In most activities, a person
bears the costs of his decisions. In the judicial system, one
party's decisions cause the opponent to incur costs and
consume judicial time as well. Most legal systems shift the
costs at the end so that the winner-the person in the right,
who ought to have been left in peace-is not the worse for
the litigation, and the person who caused the costs to be
incurred bears them. Fee-shifting, when authorized under
an exception to the American Rule, should achieve the
same end.26
Despite universal agreement on the purposes of sanctions,
including compensation to the victims of frivolous appeals,
decisions on requests for appellate sanctions often fail to serve
those goals. 7 Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of both
state and federal court decisions discussing sanctions for
frivolous appeals is how modest court awards are in relation to
the gravity of the appellant's conduct.
The Second Circuit's decision in Warner Brothers, Inc. v.
Dae Rim Trading, Inc.,2is illustrative. There, the court found
that the appellant's attorney had "demonstrated a blatant
disregard of the rules and regulations which permit the judicial
25. Id. at 471-72.
26. In re Central Ice Cream Co., 841 F.2d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 1988). Judge Easterbrook
has also commented about Rule II sanctions that "[l]itigation gives lawyers opportunities
to impose on their adversaries costs much greater than they impose on their own clients.
The greater the disparity, the more litigation becomes a predatory instrument rather than a
method of resolving honest disputes." In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441,446 (7th Cir. 1985).
27. Federal appellate courts frequently refuse to impose sanctions on the ground that
the appellee included a request for sanctions only in its brief and did not file a separate
motion. See e.g. Onossian v. Block, 175 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 38 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly allows courts to impose sanctions only
after either "a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity
to respond." The Advisory Committee Notes to the rule explicitly warn that "[a] statement
inserted in a party's brief that the party moves for sanctions is not sufficient notice," a
warning that nonetheless appears to be frequently ignored. See Fed. R. App. P. 38,
Advisory Comm. Notes to 1994 Amendments.
28. 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
machinery to function smoothly."29 The attorney's tactics
included citing in his brief to 150 cases, many of which had not
been concluded but were only in the process of being litigated,
and relying on evidence not admitted below. The court
complained, "We are not informed which, if any, of the cited
cases were finally adjudicated and what questions, if any, were
considered by the adjudicating court."30 As a result, the Second
Circuit concluded that the attorney's conduct had made "a farce
and mockery of the entire briefing and legal memorandum
process and place[d] an intolerable and almost insurmountable
burden on both opposing counsel and the Court."3
Nevertheless, the court sanctioned the attorney a grand total of
$1,000, plus double costs.
More recently, the Seventh Circuit confronted an equally
frivolous appeal in Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt
Ltd.32 In that case, an attorney found in civil contempt for
disclosing confidential information had filed a series of appeals
and lengthy appellate pleadings challenging various aspects of
the contempt order. Each time, the court of appeals concluded
that his appeals and pleadings were frivolous, and on one
occasion the court referred the attorney's conduct on appeal to
the state disciplinary commission. After the third appellate filing
in this years-long saga, the court explicitly warned the attorney
that if he continued to file frivolous papers, the court would
impose sanctions. The attorney persisted, however, filing two
more appeals in the Seventh Circuit after receiving the formal
warning. Though no sanctions attended the first post-warning
appeal, the court's patience had worn thin by the second appeal,
though perhaps not thin enough. For even though the court
concluded that the attorney had merely "repackage[d] his prior
appeals," had "engaged in an attempt to manipulate the legal
system," and had "failed to heed [the court's] warning," it
awarded sanctions of only $1,500 for what it concluded was a
frivolous appeal.33 Given the abusive nature of this attorney's
conduct and the multiple appeals he had spawned, it is
29. Id. at 1128.
30. Id.
31. Id (emphasis added).
32. 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002).
33. Id. at 642.
IMPOSING SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
impossible to believe that $1,500 fully compensated the
prevailing party for its attorneys fees and costs in defending
against this appellate barrage.
Similar examples abound in the federal courts, and it is not
my purpose to catalog them all. However, appellate courts send
the wrong message when they describe an appellant as
"repeatedly advanc[ing] arguments on appeal that have been
squarely rejected by [governing] case law, even after being
alerted to the unfavorable authority in the district court," but
award sanctions of only $700, 34 or announce that a party's
appeal gave "new meaning to the term 'frivolous,"' but then
award sanctions of only $500 in addition to double costs. 35 These
decisions do nothing to punish or deter misconduct, and they
seriously disserve parties who spent far more than $500 or $700
defending against frivolous claims.
Perhaps even more remarkable than these modest awards is
the startling fact that many federal appellate courts limit their
sanctions to double costs alone (without any fee award).
Recoverable costs in most appeals today are virtually
nonexistent. This is particularly true for the appellee in federal
court, who does not have responsibility for compiling and filing
the joint appendix. Because many law firms now print and bind
their own briefs, reproduction costs are also quite small. As a
consequence, an appellee's taxable costs might total only $100
or less. An award of twice such minimal costs can hardly be said
to fulfill the punishment, deterrence or compensatory goals of
34. See Macklin v. City of New Orleans, 300 F.3d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 2002).
35. See Buren v. U.S. Postal Serv. 883 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Top
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ortega, 285 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding appeal frivolous and in
bad faith but, without explanation, granting attorneys fees of only $2,000 and double
costs); In re Property Movers, LLC, 31 Fed. Appx. 81, 89 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding
appellant's arguments "irrelevant, illogical and utterly without any good-faith factual
basis," court awards sanctions against appellant and counsel of $3,675 plus double costs);
In re 60East 80th Street Equities, 218 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2000) (awarding trustee
only $5,000 and double costs for defending against appeal involving "baseless
arguments,' "repetitive bad faith in this case, and against the background of...
questionable conduct in another case"); Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 261
(1st Cir. 1996) (describing appellant as pressing "bizarre and irrelevant" arguments, but
awarding sanctions of only $2,725); S.R. Mercantile Corp. v. Maloney, 909 F.2d 79, 82, 84
(2d Cir. 1990) (finding that the conduct of the appellant and his attorney constituted a
"textbook example of abuse of the appellate process," but imposing sanctions of only
$1,000 in light of sanctioned attorney's professed poverty).
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appellate sanctions. These awards are, at best, an essentially
meaningless "slap on the wrist."
As but one example of this "double cost" phenomenon,
consider the following. In a recent case, a federal district court
awarded the plaintiff $16,000 in attorneys' fees under Rule 11
because the arguments of defendant's counsel in the trial court
were made in bad faith and were patently frivolous. When the
defendant raised the identical arguments on appeal, the appellate
court had little difficulty in also rejecting them as frivolous. But
when it came time to award sanctions, the appellate court
awarded the plaintiff only double costs for having to brief and
orally argue the same frivolous arguments that had prompted the
district court to award the plaintiff its full attorneys' fees.36 Since
the lawyer who prepared the plaintiff's appellate brief and
conducted the oral argument did not do so for free, it is apparent
that the real loser in that frivolous appeal was the plaintiff itself.
State appellate judges appear to be at least as hesitant as
their federal counterparts to use sanctions to compensate fully
the victims of frivolous appeals. Nominal sanctions, or none at
all, are commonplace, even when the court concludes that an
appeal is frivolous and the appellant's tactics have imposed
substantial costs on the appellee and the court itself. Thus, in
Avery v. Steele, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
labeled an appeal "egregious" but awarded as a sanction only
double costs.1' And in In re Will of Rub, the North Dakota
36. See Doctor's Assoc., Inc v. Kroll, 94 CV 1738 (PCD) (D. Conn. 1995), aff'd,
Doctor's Assoc., Inc v. Kroll, Nos. 95-7804 and 96-7048, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12273
(2d Cir. Apr. 29, 1996). The author's law firm (though not the author himself) represented
the plaintiff in that case. See also SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1993)
(awarding double costs alone after finding appeal was "nothing more than a frivolous play
for time, delaying the inevitable by wasting the resources of this court and the [appellee]
alike"); Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1991) (imposing sanctions
of double costs only); In re Continental Invest. Corp, 642 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1980) (even
though the court described appellant's arguments as "captious, patently frivolous, fatuous
at best and deliberately misleading at worst, and so brazenly misleading as to evoke awe,"
it awarded sanctions of double costs alone).
37. 608 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Mass. 1993). See also Steadman v. Steadman, 559 S.E.2d
291, 292 (N.C. App. 2002) (awarding double costs as the only sanction for what the court
described as a second premature and improper appeal); Barnett Bank v. Hazel, 555 S.E.2d
195, 198 (Ga. App. 2d Div. 2001) (awarding sanctions of only $1000 for frivolous appeal);
Fraser Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Labbe, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Me. 1998) (finding
appeal to be "frivolous" and "intended only for delay," but awarding sanctions of only
$500).
IMPOSING SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
Supreme Court described an appeal as "so boldly and patently
frivolous as to approach contemptuous behavior," but that
behavior resulted in a sanction of only $1,000 and costs. 8 These
are but two of many examples of the unwillingness of state
appellate judges to award meaningful sanctions in the face of
frivolous arguments oregregious conduct.39
Some appellate judges may suppose that it should not cost
much to defend against an appeal that is truly frivolous. But any
such supposition is unrealistic and unfounded. Processing
appeals in state and federal appellate courts typically requires
participation in court-sponsored settlement efforts, the filing of
at least one brief and, in most state appellate courts, attendance
at oral argument. These tasks cannot possibly be accomplished
for $500 or $700 or even $1,500. Moreover, if, as often occurs
in frivolous appeals, the appellant has cloaked unmeritorious
arguments in the garb of close questions or respectability, has
proliferated the number of claims and arguments, or has
misrepresented the record or case law, it may take substantial
effort to reveal the frivolous nature of the appeal to the appellate
court. As discussed at the outset of this essay, there may be valid
reasons for not imposing appellate sanctions at all. However, if a
court concludes that sanctions are warranted, there seems little
justification for failing to award the full extent of the costs
reasonably incurred in responding to a frivolous appeal.4"
In fairness, there are many exceptions in state and federal
appellate courts to this seeming pattern of miniscule sanctions
38. 510 N.W.2d 583, 583 (N.D. 1994).
39. See e.g. Karnes v. Karnes, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3678, at *8 (Ohio App. 4th Dist.
Aug. 17, 2001) (declining to award any sanctions against pro se appellant for frivolous
appeal); Surratt v. Watts Trucking, 541 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Neb. 1994) (labeling appeal
"meritless," yet awarding no sanctions); In re Sherman Hollow, 641 A.2d 753, 757 (Vt.
1993) (awarding no sanctions, even though appellant's arguments had "little foundation"
and were "inadequately briefed").
40. Federal District Judge Jack Weinstein would undoubtedly disagree with this
sentiment. He has suggested that it is overly simplistic to speak of claims as either
frivolous or nonfrivolous. "Reality is more complicated. In the legal world, claims span the
entire continuum from overwhelmingly strong to outrageously weak. . . . Attorney fee
awards of the full market value of services should be reserved for extremely frivolous
cases, while more moderate awards should be given for frivolous filings near the border."
Eastway Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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for frivolous appeals.4' In fact, in many instances, appellate
courts simply announce an award of "attorneys' fees and double
costs" in their decision without specifying a particular amount,
leaving that determination to later proceedings, court staff or
even the district court.42 In those cases, it is possible that the
prevailing party is ultimately fully compensated for the
attorneys' fees it incurred in defending against the frivolous
appeal. Nonetheless, the sheer number of relatively modest
awards in published decisions remains noteworthy.
Appellate judges continue to complain that they are flooded
with frivolous appeals that divert time and attention from cases
that truly warrant consideration. In view of the reported
decisions, however, appellate courts may well be victims of their
own timidity. Were courts the only ones hurt by frivolous
appeals, that would be reason enough for change. But the
judiciary is not the only victim of frivolous appeals. Imposing
sanctions is undoubtedly an unpleasant duty for most appellate
judges. However, to those who have been forced to bear the
expense of defending against a frivolous appeal, sanctions are as
important to providing complete justice as the affirmance itself.
41. See e.g. Central Ice Cream, 841 F.2d at 734-35 (acknowledging that an award of
attorneys' fees should be "fully compensatory" and awarding fees of $20,000, but
discounting appellee's statement showing that it had incurred $64,000 of fees in defending
the appeal); Bank of Cal. v. Varakin, 265 Cal. Rptr. 666, 670-71 (Cal. App. Dist. I Div. 2
1990) (imposing sanctions of $37,000 and recounting three separate California decisions
granting sanctions of $14,000, $118,909 and $50,000, respectively).
42. See e.g. George v. City of Morro Bay, 298 F.3d 1160, 1164, (9th Cir. 2002)
(awarding attorneys fees for frivolous appeal but directing appellate commissioner to
determine amount of fees); Beilue v. Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 13 Fed. Appx. 810, 815 (10th
Cir. 2001) (remanding to district court to determine amount of sanction); Bramwell v.
South Rigby Canal Co., 39 P.3d 588, 592 (Idaho 2001) (awarding "reasonable" attorneys
fees for frivolous appeal without specifying amount).
